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“There is a lot of evidence that such overconfidence in intuition is a powerful force in the markets.” 
Robert J. Shiller 
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Inspired by the World Cup effect discovered by Kaplanski and Levy (2010), we decided to in-
vestigate the 2014th edition. Our findings were conclusive.  The average return on the U.S. stock 
market during the latest World Cup was +0.87%, compared to an average of -2.42% of all past 
World Cups; hence, the anomaly disappeared. We suggest its disappearance was driven by: (1) 
the growth popularity of Football in the U.S. and its influence on the local stock market, and by 
(2) the publication of Kaplanski and Levy (2010 and 2014) followed by an investment strategy, 





Inspiré par « l'effet Coupe du Monde » découvert par Kaplanski et Levi (2010), nous avons déci-
dé d'enquêter sur la 2014e édition. Nos résultats ont été concluants. Le rendement moyen sur le 
marché boursier américain au cours de la dernière Coupe du Monde était de + 0,87%, quant à 
celle de l'ensemble des dernières Coupes du Monde était de -2,42% ; par conséquent, l'anomalie 
a disparu. Nous avons conclu que ce changement été lié à: (1) la croissance de popularité du 
football aux Etats-Unis et son influence sur le marché boursier local, et par (2) la publication de 
Kaplanski et Levi (2010 et 2014) qui a été suivie par une stratégie d'investissement qui a permis 
aux investisseurs qui étaient au courant de profiter de cette situation. 
Mots-clés: La finance comportementale, Anomalies de marché, L'efficacité du marché, Le senti-




Inspirado pelo efeito Campeonato do Mundo descoberto por Kaplanski e Levy (2010), decidimos 
investigar a edição de 2014. Os nossos resultados foram conclusivos; os retornos do NYSE 
Composite Index durante o Campeonato do Mundo de 2014 foram de +0,87%, em comparação 
com uma média de -2,42% de todas as edições anteriores, o que faz com que a anomalia tenha 
desaparecido. Sugerimos como razões para o seu desaparecimento: (1) o crescimento da popula-
ridade do futebol nos EUA e a sua influência nos mercados financeiros, e (2) a publicação de 
Kaplanski e Levy (2010 e 2014) acompanhado de uma estratégia de investimento o que permitiu 
aos investidores sofisticados tirar vantagem da anomalia. 
Palavras-chave: Finanças comportamentais, Anomalias financeiras, Eficiência do mercado fi-
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I always felt inspired by behavioral finance and its impact on the finance field. In such a prag-
matic industry why would exogenous factors, such as weather or sporting events, influence be-
havior?  
I pursued my interest in this subject matter during the Empirical Finance final project at 
Católica-Lisbon, which investigated the relation between temperature and stock market returns.  
Indeed, a statistically significant negative correlation was found. Although there are numerous 
financial market anomalies, for this investigation I chose to examine the FIFA World Cup effect 
because it combines two of my passions, football and finance.  
When I first read the paper of Guy Kaplanski and Haim Levy (2010 and 2014), I was 
astonished by their results and posed the questions: 
1. What happened during the 2014th FIFA World Cup? 
2. If the effect persisted, why did it persist? 
3. If not, why and what has changed? 
To address these questions, we replicated Kaplanski and Levy (2010 and 2014) analyses 
for two time periods: (1) from 1950 to 2006, to cross check their results and (2) from 1950 to 
2014, to include the latest FIFA World Cup. On top of these analyses, we also hypothesized two 
reasons for the disappearance of the effect. 
The primary goal of this research was to find out if the effect persisted over the 2014
th
 World 
Cup and what factors were driving this anomaly. Consequently we tested the following hypothe-
sis:  
1. The U.S. stock market is efficient and therefore there are no abnormal returns. 
2. The potential number of disappointed fans affects the stock market returns. 




According to our research, the effect disappeared and therefore we complemented our 
analysis with the following hypothesis, in order to understand the popularity of football before 
and after the 2010
th
 World Cup: 
4. The U.S. national football team results affect the stock market returns. 
Our work will be structured the following way: Section I introduces the topic; Section II 
presents the relevant literature review; Section III and IV report 2014
th
 FIFA World Cup key 
figures and the impact of foreign direct investment in the U.S., respectively; Section V and VI 
analyze the data and explain the methodology used, respectively; Section VII presents the results 
and Section VIII concludes. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
MARKET EFFICIENCY 
DEFINITION 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) introduced by Fama (1965), which claims that 
in an efficient market, stock prices fully reflect all the available information. In efficient stock 
markets, returns are supposed to follow a random walk and investors should expect to obtain an 
equilibrium rate of return. The random walk hypothesis states that price changes are unpredicta-
ble, meaning future returns are not predictable on the basis of past ones. The information con-
tained in the past prices is fully and instantly reflected in present prices in an efficient market as 
argued by Fama (1965). Following his study, many researchers examined the efficiency of capi-
tal markets. Since the introduction of EMH (Fama, 1965) researchers have documented several 
market anomalies in the stock returns.  
TYPE OF EFFICIENCY FORMS 
There are three forms of market efficiency: weak, semi-strong and strong. Weak form of 
market efficiency states that current market prices capture all information contained on past pric-
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es and volume data. Semi-strong, goes further by capturing all publicly available information. 
Finally, strong form of efficiency states that current market prices reflect not only all publicly 




Lo (1997) states that researchers have not yet reached a consensus about whether finan-
cial markets are efficient or not, in fact it is not the objective of the authors to test that hypothe-
sis, but to show evidence of a specific market anomaly during a specific time period – the World 
Cup Effect. 
Reputable scholars such as Richard Roll, Robert Haugen or Paul Samuelson commented 
the existence of market anomalies and their exploitation. Richard Roll (1994) made it public that 
“Over the past decade, I have attempted to exploit many of the seemingly most promising ‘ineffi-
ciencies’ by actually trading significant amounts of money (…) Many of these effects are surpris-
ingly strong in the reported empirical work, but I have never yet found one that worked in prac-
tice.”.  Paul Samuelson (1989) recognized that taking advantage of market anomalies before they 
being exploited by other players is a challenge that only a few masterminds can have the pleasure 
to do. He adds that “Out of the thousands of published and unpublished statistical testings of 
various forms of the [efficient market] hypothesis, a few dozen representing a minuscule per-
centage have isolated profitable exceptions to the theory.” Finally, Robert Haugen (1995) cites 
that “In the course of the last 10 years, financial economists have been struggling to explain (…) 
the huge, predictable premiums in the cross-section of equity returns” 
According to Brennan and Xia (2001), a market anomaly is “the statistically significant 
difference between the realized average return (…) and the returns that are predicted by a par-
ticular asset pricing model”. Frankfurter and McGoun (2002) defined anomaly as “an irregu-
larity or a deviation from common or natural order or an exceptional condition”. In fact, anoma-
lies may occur once, often or even endlessly, but they are a clear indicator of capital markets 
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inefficiency. Tversky & Kahneman (1986) defined market anomalies as “an anomaly is a devia-
tion from the presently accepted paradigms that is too widespread to be ignored, too systematic 
to be dismissed as random error and too fundamental to be accommodated by relaxing the nor-
mative system”. In a nutshell and according to financial literature, market anomalies are de-
scribed as uncommon situations in which the movement of a share or a group of shares diverges 
from the conventions of EMH.  
Abnormal returns – actual return minus expected return – are expected to be zero in effi-
cient markets, thus persistence realization of those represents an anomaly and consequently 
translates into predictability of future returns. It is therefore a market distortion that investors 
have been taking advantage of. However, according to Chordia et al. (2014), the recent policies 
of liquidity stimulation and lower trading costs made the average returns from a portfolio strate-
gy based on anomalies decreased considerably. Furthermore, Schwert (2003) points out that 
market anomalies tend to attenuate or even disappear after being reported and also that mispric-
ing opportunities may not hold for different time periods.  
Market anomalies have been identified many years ago and somehow they still persist, 
but as Hawawini and Keim (1995) argued, there are no “guarantees [of] their presence in the 
future”. However, there may be numerous reasons for their existence. Firstly, the lack of under-
standing of such mispricing might move away investors from investing in such opportunity. Sec-
ondly, arbitrage might be too costly due to the bid-ask spread, complexity or transaction costs. 
Thirdly, the potential profit might be not enough to give it a try, even if the chance exists. 
Fourthly, the opportunity might be restricted due to trading limitations. Lastly, investors are not 
always rational and even with new information they might not change their behavior. 
According to Latif et al. (2012) market anomalies can be divided into three categories: 
(1) fundamental, (2) technical and (3) calendar or seasonal anomalies. We created a fourth cate-







- Value anomaly 
Graham & Dodd (1934) proved in their research that value stocks outperformed growth stocks. 
According to their study, value shares perform better than growth ones given its actual growth 
rate and sales. As proven by Lakonishok et al. (1992), market tends to overestimate growth of 
the growth stocks and they do it for two reasons: (1) take the wrong conclusions with the existing 
data and (2) tend to focus too much on past performance, even though there are low probabilities 
it will occur in the future.  
However, both authors agree that institutional investors do not take the wrong conclu-
sions but rather have a preference for growth stocks over value, since they were more likely to be 
the past winners. Lakonishok et al. (1993) adds that this preference is related to the time horizon 
individuals want their return, which is considerably shorter than institutional investors. Finally, 
some authors claimed that riskiness was actually the cause for higher performance of value 
stocks over growth stocks. But, based on other studies (Lakonishok, 2002) value stocks are not 
riskier when looking at its volatility and beta. 
- Low P/E 
As identified by Ball and Brown (1968) and Goodman & Peavy (1983), companies with a lower 
Price to Earnings ratio (PER) were more likely to generate higher future returns and outperform 
the market while those with a high PER tend to underperform. 
- Size effect 
The widely known size effect, where small cap stocks tend to outperform larger cap stocks was 
firstly described by Banz (1981). The author found a higher risk adjusted return for smaller firms 
since 1941. Such anomaly was even recommended as an investment strategy by Haugen and 
Lakonishok (1988).  
- Book to Market ratio  
Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok (1991) and Fama and French (1992) found that higher book-to-
market ratios (the ratio of the book value of a common stock to its market value) tend to be asso-
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ciated with higher expected returns. Value effect is well described by Fama and French (1992) 
and it consists in the creation of portfolios with a long position on stocks with the highest Book-
to-Market ratio and a short one on stocks with the lowest Book-to-Market ratio. 
- Net Payout Yield 
In 1988, Fama and French introduced the dividend yield effect. Stocks with a higher dividend 
yield generated higher future returns than those with low dividend yields. However, more recent-
ly academic studies started to show weakened results and discovered a new effect – Net Payout 
Yield. Boudoukh et al. (2007) found Net Payout Yield - dividends plus repurchases minus issu-
ances – a much stronger predictor of future equity performance than dividend yield. Gray and 
Vogel (2012) also explored the use of net-debt paydown, which added robustness to the stock-
holder metric. A strong argument for the weakening of the dividend yield effect is related with 
the recent SEC regulation changes.  
 
- Low-volatility anomaly 
Ali et al. (2003) study combined the Book-to-market effect with volatility and found that the 
value effect was greater for stocks with high idiosyncratic return volatility. Baker et al. (2011) 
also discovered that low volatility stocks consistently outperform high volatility stocks, which 
was also supported by Dutt et al. (2013). As a supporting argument for the low volatility anoma-
ly, the latter study found a strong correlation between low volatility stocks and higher operating 
returns. 
TECHNICAL 
- Momentum  
Momentum strategies are characterized by a short position on stocks that have declined its value 
in the past (losers) and long position on firms with recent positive returns (winners). This anoma-
ly was firstly identified by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and later developed by Hons & Tonks 
(2001), which divided the strategy into two portfolio (loser’s and winner’s) and reported higher 




- Moving Averages  
Although technical analyses were in use since the 1800s, Brock et al. (1992) was one of the first 
studies to show its potential. Moving averages are techniques in which past prices are used in 
order to predict future prices. They are characterized by mainly two price averages, one long and 
one short, typical 50 and 15 days respectively. Investors must sell a stock whenever the short 
average is lower than the longer one and must buy it whenever the short average is above the 
longer one. 
- Trading Range Break  
Trading Range Break is another technical analysis studied by Brock et al. (1992), where buy and 
sell signals are determined by the last 50,150 or 200 days maximum or minimum. An investor 
would sell a stock if its price falls below a minimum or if it goes above a maximum. Although 
difficult to implement, the study showed significant and positive returns. 
CALENDAR 
As Boudreaux (1995) concluded, calendar or seasonal anomalies contradict the weak form of 
efficiency because it assumes markets can be predicted based on past information. Hence, the 
existence of such variations contradicts EMH, meaning investors can earn substantial abnormal 
returns. 
- January effect 
In 1942, Watchel reported for the first time seasonal effects, in what he recommended a “well 
worth watching when formulating an actual investment policy”. Rozeff and Kinney (1976) found 
that the average return for the month of January was higher than for any other month in NYSE 
from 1904 to 1974, which they called the January effect. Few years later, Keim (1983) and 
Reinganum (1983) claimed that returns for small firms were higher than for larger ones, however 
disagreed on the reason. Whereas the former argued that this pattern was due to the tax-loss-
selling effect, the latter disagreed questioning the true reason for such difference in returns when 
controlling for size. Lakonishok and Haugen (1987) suggested that the January effect might be 
due to the window dressing effect, meaning that investors, especially fund managers, sell their 
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poor performers in December in order to hide their losses and buy them back again in January to 
hold their optimal portfolio structure again. 
- Holiday effect 
The holiday effect was firstly reported by Lakonishok and Smidt (1988) and showed that half of 
the positive returns of Dow Jones occurred during the 10 pre-holiday trading days. Cadsby and 
Ratner (1992) also observed this effect in the US but not in Europe. Ariel (1990) went further 
and stated that more than one-third of the positive returns in the U.S. occurred on the 8 days be-
fore a market closed holiday. 
- Day of the week effect 
Kelly (1930) found with three years of data that Monday was the worst day to buy stocks. Hirsch 
(1968) and Cross (1973) drew the same conclusions, but Franck Cross compared Friday average 
returns with those of Monday. Gibbons and Hess (1981) also compared the first and the last trad-
ing days of the week, concluding that Friday had higher returns. Another perspective had Jaffe 
and Westerfield (1989) and Brooks and Persand (2001) reporting Tuesday as the day with the 
lowest returns for Japan and Australia and for Malaysia and Thailand, respectively. 
- Religious effects 
Bialkowski et al. (2010) studied the stock market returns during the Muslim Holy Month and 
discovered that returns were significantly higher and less volatile during this period than the rest 
of the year. On the other hand, Lakonishok & Smidt (1988) studied stock markets around 
Christmas time and discovered that “the price increase from the last trading day before Christ-
mas to the end of the year is over 1.5%”. 
OTHERS 
- Neglected Stocks 
Neglected Stocks, or Reversals occur when either past top or worst performing stocks reverse 
and tend to out- or underperform the market in subsequent periods. This event is usually attribut-
ed to investors’ expectations of poorly performing stocks to succeed and high flyers to fall. An-
other common explanation is related to investment fundamentals, i.e. if a stock is performing 
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well, it will become relatively expensive and therefore its valuation will decrease. The same log-
ic applies to underperforming stocks. De Bondt & Thaler (1985) studied the event and found that 
portfolios of prior “losers” consistently outperformed prior “winners”. The authors identified 
gains of 25% for the past “losers” portfolios compared to those of past “winners” for data ranges 
as long as 36 months after the creation of the portfolios, which was consistent with their hypoth-
esis of markets overreaction. Furthermore, Tversky and Kahneman (1973) argued that a possible 
reason for such anomaly might be the “excessive pessimism about the future prospects of compa-
nies that had done poorly”. 
- Dogs Of The Dow 
The Dogs of the Dow anomaly was discovered by John Slatter and involves trading the stocks of 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA). According to this anomaly, an investor who held an 
equally-weighted portfolio of the ten highest dividend-yielding stocks, for one year, would have 
an average return of 16.06% versus 10.91% of the overall index. This strategy was particularly 
successful after the crash of 1987, where the dogs were indeed the underperformers and actually 
recovered post-crisis. Domian et al. (1998) concluded that the strategy succeeded around the 
crisis period but weakened afterwards suggesting overreaction as a cause for the success. How-
ever, more recently Rinne
 
and Vähämaa (2011) conducted an empirical study of this strategy in 
the Finnish market and reported average annual abnormal returns of 4.5%. 
- Temperature Anomaly 
People tend to rate their life satisfactions much higher on sunny days than on cloudy or raining 
days (Schwartz and Clore, 1983). Evidence suggests that low temperatures tend to cause aggres-
sion, and high temperatures tend to cause aggression, hysteria or apathy (Cao and Wei, 2005). 
According to Saunders (1993) research, less cloud cover is associated with higher returns, and 
the returns’ difference between the cloudiest days and the least cloudy days is statistically signif-
icant. Investors’ mood is upbeat or optimistic on sunny days, which uplifts the stock market re-
turns. Conversely, their pessimistic mood on cloudy days depresses the stock returns. Hence, 
Saunders (1993) as well as Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) argued that weather can indeed af-
fect the behavior of market traders and consequently stock returns. Also, in an empirical study 
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incorporating many weather variables, Howarth and Hoffman (1984) found that humidity, tem-
perature and sunshine exercise the greatest influence on mood.  
Other studies have tested the impact of ambient temperature alone on mood, behavior and 
task performance. Allen and Fisher (1978) and Wyndham (1969) found that task-performing 
abilities are weakened when individuals are exposed to very high or low temperature. 
- Daylight Saving Anomaly 
Sleeping is crucial in everyone’s life, and even if researchers have been showing its positive ef-
fects on productivity and wellness
1
, stock market participants have been sleeping less. Kamstra’s 
et al. (2000) analyzed the effect of daylight saving changes on financial markets. His study 
showed evidence that, weeks following daylight-saving weekends have large negative returns. 




Investor behavior is an important field to which has been devoted increasing attention on capital 
market studies. Two perspectives have been taking into account: traditional and behavioral fi-
nance. Most studies focused on the institutional investors behaviors, due to data availability and 
impact on the market.  
Although, investment behavior has been investigated from the perspective of investment 
selection decisions, such as the risk-return paradigm, more recent research focused on internal 
and external behavioral factors. Investment behavior theories attempt to explain the rationality or 
irrationality behind investment decisions and how they differ among investors, assuming equal 
amount of information. 
                                                 
1
 Dababneh, A. J., Swanson, N., & Shell, R. L. (2001). Impact of added rest breaks on the productivity and well-
being of workers. Ergonomics, 44(2), 164-174. 
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Under the EMH, traditional finance theory argues that stock prices fully reflect the in-
formation available and all players are rational. However, more recently researchers have been 
connecting the psychological state of the investors to the markets. 
Barber and Odean (2000) disagree that all investors behave rationally, even though mod-
ern financial economics defend it. Moreover, investor’s irrational behavior tends to occur more 
frequently than it was supposed. Behavioral finance includes these conducts into financial mar-
ket models. There are mainly two common slip-ups investors make: trade excessively and tend to 
disproportionately hold on losing investments while selling winners. These authors argue that 
these deviations come from human psychology. Human beings are naturally over confident and 
that is the first reason for the bias, while the second is related with the necessity to avoid a regret 
sentiment. 
Therefore, it is well established in the psychological literature that mood, feelings and 
emotions affect people’s decisions according to Schwartz (1990) and Loewenstein et al. (2001), 
and that mood itself can be influenced by environmental factors such as weather conditions, con-
firmed by Watson (2000).  
 
SPORTING EVENTS  
Another equally important part of this study is related with sports and how they impact econo-
mies and investors behavior. In fact, the economic impact of sports events is a well-studied sub-
ject. Fourie and Santana-Gallego (2011) concluded that countries hosting sports events see an 
increase of 12.5% on tourist arrivals. Moreover, even those countries that were ready to host one, 
but lost the bid, still see an increase of 3.4%. Kavetsos and Szymanski (2010) studied the 
“feelgood” factor around sports events, concluding that “hosting major sporting events raises 
reported happiness”, especially for football events. However, they claim this “fellgood” factor is 
not systematic and appears to be a short term effect.  
This finding is of extreme importance given the existing link reported by Edmans et al. 
(2007) between mood and stock returns. According to his study, which involved 39 countries and 
32 years of data (1973 to 2004), football results are strongly correlated with stock market returns, 
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especially on football losses. Edmans et al (2007) reported “a loss in the World Cup elimination 
stage leads to a next-day abnormal stock return of -49 basis points.” On the same topic, Ashton 
et al. (2003) measured the impact of the England football team on the FTSE 100 index. The 
study reported a “statistically significant relationship between the performance of the English 
national football team and the exchange in the price of shares traded on the London stock ex-
change”. Whitfield (2003) reported that a good result in soccer games affects psychologically 
trader’s investment decisions. As an example, when England team was knocked off the 1990 
World Cup, the London Stock Exchange fell by 1%. Finally, in Turkey it was proven that foot-
ball results affected stock market returns by Berument et al. (2006). Berument observed an in-





 FIFA WORLD CUP 
Outside United States of America and Canada, the World Cup is the most important sporting 
event. Despite the already mentioned effects, the FIFA World Cup has a vast media attention, 
comparable only to the Olympic Games, with an extensive TV audience, massive merchandise 
sales and huge attention and involvement by the fans. The 2014
th
 edition was special because it 
broke numerous records in what concerns television audience. In order to understand its impact, 
key figures
2
 are presented below, split into digital exposure (U.S. and Worldwide) and financial 
impact: 
Digital Exposure - US 
- All-time record figures in online streaming of matches in the USA 
- 2014th World Cup beat TV viewing figures for 2014 NBA Finals and 2013 World Series  
- “The audience reach in the USA saw a near 20% rise versus that achieved in 2006, with 
94.5 million viewers watching some part of the tournament in-home. This is the largest 
increase in audience reach of any measured market analyzed.” 





Digital Exposure - Worldwide 
- 214 countries reached 
- 1+ billion people have watched some coverage of the Final game 
- All-time high TV viewing records in Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium  
- The final between GER v ARG attracted the biggest audience in German TV history 
- Most data ever streamed for an event as fans watch online 
- Biggest audience for a TV show in France for 7 years 
- Biggest audience for a TV show achieved in UK, Italy, Spain and Portugal for 2 years 
- The official FIFA app recently became the biggest sports event app of all time with a rec-
ord 28 million downloads. 
- 451 million Facebook users were, while FIFA’s Twitter followers surpassed the 16-
million mark. The official FIFA World Cup Instagram app increased from 42,000 to 0.8 
million followers 
- 40+ billion impressions of official FIFA World Cup digital content 
 
Finance 
- The tournament will bring an additional R$112.79 billion to the Brazilian economy 
- Tax revenue for shall amount to as much as USD 7.2 billion3 
- According to the Getulio Vargas Foundation, 14 million jobs have been created in the last 
four years because of the FIFA World Cup, the equivalent of 180 Maracana stadiums 
filled to capacity 
- FIFA invested more than US$ 850 million in the organization of the FIFA World Cup in 
Brazil 
- FIFA staff spent more than 600,000 nights in hotels  
- In hotel accommodation in Brazil alone, FIFA and the organizing committee spent more 
than 500 million reais  
 
                                                 
3
 Ernst & Young and Getulio Vargas Foundation 2014 World Cup report 
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IV. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE U.S. 
Although soccer popularity has grown exponentially, it still remains as the 4
th
 most popular sport 
in the U.S., therefore the results of the U.S. national team should not affect directly the stock 
market, or at least not in the same magnitude as other they do in other countries. Additionally, 
U.S. stock market is known to be very liquid, which would help in case an investment strategy is 
put in place. Finally, it is the market where more foreign investors invest. 
Foreign direct investment in the United States accounted for 16.5%
4
 of the GDP, which 
shows the importance of foreign capital in the American economy. On a historical cost basis, 
totaled $2.8 trillion in 2013, an increase of $0.5 trillion versus 2010, when the last World Cup 
occurred. United States is the world’s most attractive country in what concerns foreign invest-
ment, ahead of China, Russia, Hong Kong and Brazil. However, its share among all foreign di-
rect investment dropped from more than 33% in 2000 to less than 20% in 2013, which is a con-
sequence of the multinationals expansion for faster growing economies and the competition for 
foreign investments. From the participating countries, seven of them account for 90% of all Eq-
uity held by World Cup countries. As it can be seen in Figure 1, the leading investor is the Unit-
ed Kingdom with $741b, followed by Japan ($361b) and Switzerland ($331b). 
When looking at all countries holding US Equity, Canada is the leader with holdings of 
almost $770b, followed by United Kingdom and Japan. The seven countries in Panel B represent 
almost 70% of all US equity held by foreign investors. The “Others” slice aggregates 191 coun-





                                                 
4
 Foreign Direct Investment in the United States 2014 Report, Organization for International Investment 
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Figure 1 - % of U.S. Equity held by World Cup countries and by Foreign Investors in 2014 
Figure 1 reports the percentage of U.S. equity held by World Cup countries (Panel A) and by all foreign countries (Panel B). On Panel A, 28 
countries are reported, being Algeria, Iran and Nigeria the countries without U.S. equity. The other country missing is USA. The “Others” slice 
corresponds to 21 countries and $223b in investment. Panel B aggregates 198 countries and the “Others” slice corresponds to 191 countries and 
$1.3t in investment. 
 
Overall, the 28 teams present in the 2014
th
 FIFA World Cup account for 56% of the all 
US Equity held by foreign investors in 2014, which represents an increase from 44% in 2010 
(Figure 2). Although this percentage is relatively small compared to 1974, where it reached al-
most 85%, we need to take into consideration the evolution of the markets and the international 
investment in rapidly growing economies. The $4.1 trillion of Equity held by foreign investors in 
2014 is the maximum since 2002, which by itself proves the importance of such investments for 












































Figure 2 - % of U.S. Equity held by World Cup countries 
Figure 2 reports the evolution of the percentage of U.S. Equity held by World Cup Countries since 1974 until 2014. 
 
In order to better understand the magnitude of those investments and the share each coun-
try allocates to U.S. Equity, Table 1 presents a comparison between the dollar value of U.S. equi-
ty held by World Cup countries and the percentage of their equity portfolio invested in the Unit-
ed States of America in 2010 and 2014. In 2014, the total amount invested by foreign investors 
in the U.S. equity market was about $4.1 trillion, which constitutes an increase of 55% versus 
2010. When looking at the countries participating in this World Cup, the value decreases to $2.3 
trillion, which constitutes an increase of 97%, when compared to 2010 ($1.1 trillion). About 85% 
of the participating countries increased their investments in U.S. stocks and more than half allo-
cated a higher percentage of their equity portfolio to U.S. securities versus 2010. Thus, a large 
amount of money is invested in the U.S., and it is reasonable to assume that if part of the portfo-
lio is sold, this market will be affected. Finally, about one-fifth
5
 of the New York Stock Ex-
change (NYSE) listed companies are foreign. Hence, foreign investors are familiar with the U.S. 
stock market and it’s reasonable to assume that a part of them hold a percentage of these compa-
nies. Furthermore, most of these companies are listed both in New York and in their country of 
origin; therefore, even if foreign investors sell their shares in the local market, the U.S. market 
will be affected otherwise arbitrage opportunities would exist. 











Table 1 - Foreign holdings of U.S. securities by Country 
Table 1 reports the value of foreign holdings of U.S. equity and the percentage of their portfolios invested in the U.S. N/A indicates the data was 
not available for that country. 
  
U.S. Equity ($m)6 
 





























































































































































































































































Bosnia And Herzegovina   1   1   N/A   N/A 
         
Total World Cup Countries  1.174.787  2.315.113     
Total All Countries  2.650.010  4.099.529     
 
                                                 
6
 U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business (April 2014) - http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/data-chart-center/tic/Pages/fpis.aspx 
7





The returns employed on this analysis will be those of NYSE Composite Index, downloaded 
from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and the dates will be from January 1
st
 of 
1950 to December 31
st
 of 2014. In total there will be 16,443 trading days, from those 255 are 
EED (Event Effect Days) and 315 are EPED (Event Effect Period Days). The returns considered 
below are based on an equally weighted portfolio. In Table 2, we present the summary statistics 
for every World Cup year, divided between the Full Year statistics and the EPED of that year.  
As we can see on Panel B, 13 out of 17 World Cups years had a negative return and an 
annualized rate of return on the World Cup EPED below the rate of return corresponding to the 
full year (Panel A). The average return for all World Cup periods is -2.23%, whereas the average 














Table 2 - Summary Statistics 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the sample, which extends from January 1950 until December 2014. There are 17 World Cups repre-
sented. It is divided in two panels: Panel A - Full Year, which compromises all trading days of every World Cup year, and Panel B - World Cup, 
which refers just to the contest period. Panel A has on average 254 trading days, whereas Panel B has on average 19 trading days. In order to 





. The market return is the 
equally-weighted index return from CRSP. Standard deviation = √𝐸((𝑋 − 𝜇)2), Skewness = 
1
𝜎3
𝐸((𝑋 − 𝜇)3 , Kurtosis = 
1
𝜎4
𝐸((𝑋 − 𝜇)4  and 
Excess Kurtosis = 
1
𝜎4
𝐸((𝑋 − 𝜇)4 − 3 are computed for both panels.  
 
Panel A: Full Year 
 
Panel B: World Cup 






St. Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
Excess 
Kurtosis 
1950 27,76% 0,85% -1,73 7,89 4,89 
 
-10,94% -94,04% 1,96% -0,83 0,78 -2,22 
1954 41,87% 0,46% -0,33 2,07 -0,93 
 
1,93% 71,20% 0,27% 1,36 0,70 -2,30 
1958 44,39% 0,50% -0,11 3,36 0,36 
 
1,95% 55,49% 0,42% -0,88 0,53 -2,47 
1962 -13,50% 0,99% -0,65 8,04 5,04 
 
-1,92% -42,00% 2,24% 0,65 0,75 -2,25 
1966 -8,75% 0,76% -0,71 1,65 -1,35 
 
-4,02% -63,20% 0,63% -1,41 3,70 0,70 
1970 -2,22% 1,08% 0,61 4,17 1,17 
 
-0,54% -11,63% 1,21% 0,31 -0,60 -3,60 
1974 -28,99% 1,22% 0,57 1,21 -1,79 
 
-14,78% -96,78% 0,85% -0,89 2,70 -0,30 
1978 10,76% 0,83% -0,31 5,85 2,85 
 
-1,55% -27,21% 0,66% -0,17 -0,31 -3,31 
1982 23,95% 0,88% 0,44 1,32 -1,68 
 
-0,13% -2,40% 0,65% 0,71 -0,09 -3,09 
1986 12,66% 0,70% -1,06 3,94 0,94 
 
-0,08% -1,47% 0,59% -0,75 2,55 -0,45 
1990 -16,43% 0,73% -0,61 2,72 -0,28 
 
-1,05% -16,76% 0,42% -0,83 0,37 -2,63 
1994 -4,63% 0,50% -0,43 3,30 0,30 
 
-1,53% -23,51% 0,51% -0,80 0,57 -2,43 
1998 -3,11% 0,93% -0,74 3,29 0,29 
 
-0,67% -10,15% 0,67% -0,52 0,78 -2,22 
2002 -7,25% 1,08% 0,15 1,16 -1,84 
 
-5,72% -62,38% 0,79% 0,74 0,35 -2,65 
2006 17,60% 0,68% 0,14 1,19 -1,81 
 
1,31% 25,35% 1,09% 0,67 0,65 -2,35 
2010 21,46% 1,22% -0,21 2,17 -0,83 
 
-0,94% -15,08% 1,34% -0,10 1,19 -1,81 
2014 1,09% 0,71% -0,36 1,14 -1,86 
 













As a matter of coherence the methodology used will be the same as Kaplanski and Levy (2010). 
The null hypothesis is that the US stock market is efficient and therefore there are no abnormal 
profits. The alternative hypothesis is that the event coefficient is statistical significant. Regarding 
the null hypothesis, the methodology used was based on Kamstra et al. (2003) and Edmans et al. 
(2007) and then ran the following regression: 
𝑅𝑡 =  𝛾0 +  ∑ 𝛾1𝑖𝑅𝑡−𝑖 +  
2





where 𝑅𝑡 is the daily stock return, 𝛾0is the regression intercept coefficient, 𝑅𝑡−1and 𝑅𝑡−2are the 
first and second previous day returns, respectively, 𝐷𝑖𝑡 , i = 1..4, are dummy variables for the day 
of the week: Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, respectively
8
, 𝐻𝑡 is a dummy varia-
ble for days after a non-weekend holiday
9
, 𝑇𝑡 is a dummy variable for the first five days of the 
fiscal year
10
, 𝑃𝑡 is a dummy variable for the annual event period (June–July), 𝐸𝑡  stands for the 
event days, and 𝐽𝑖𝑡, i = 1,2, are dummy variables for the 10 days with the highest (i = 1) and low-
est (i = 2) returns during the studied period. The variable 𝑃𝑡 is introduced in order to make sure 
the world cup returns are driven by the event rather than by the specific time of the year (june-
july). Likewise, the dummy 𝐽𝑖𝑡 controls for the 10 days with extreme returns (positive and nega-
tive). 
In terms of the event days, two variables were considered: 
a. EED (event effect days) is a game day that is also a trading day and the following day. 
This definition is based on Edmans et al. (2007) findings that the local effect occurs on 
the day after the game. I have decided to include the same day of the game as the NYSE 
was still open after some of the world cup games. 
b. EPED (event period effect days) includes all competition days plus break days and two 
additional trading days. The first EPED is the day of the first game and the last is the day 
after the final game. 
                                                 
8
 Chang, Pinegar, and Ravichandran (1993) and Abraham and Ikenberry (1994) 
9
 Kim and Park (1994) 
10
 Dyl and Maberly (1992) 
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The model will be regressed twice, firstly with an Equally Weighted index from CRSP 
and secondly with a Value Weighted Index. It is assumed that returns’ volatility is constant. 
However, according to past literature
11
 returns have time-varying volatility. To address this is-
sue, Kaplanski and Levy (2010) and Edmans et al. (2007) modelled the stock returns using the 
generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity GARCH (1,1). The results of the 
GARCH (1, 1) model didn’t affect their conclusions; therefore, we decided to not include this 
analysis. 
Additionally, we reproduced the following analyses in order to verify the existence of the 
arbitrage opportunity found by Kaplanski and Levy (2010): 
1. Computed returns for the 2014th World Cup and compared them with those of that year. 
2. Computed returns for all past World Cup competitions (2014th edition included), starting 
in 1950, and compare it with the returns of that year. The objective is to understand if the 
effect is related with the World Cup or if the year was exceptionally worse than the oth-
ers. 
3. Compared returns for World Cup years with non-World Cup years, to understand if the 
effect was driven by a worse than normal World Cup year or if it was directly related 
with the event. Computed returns for both and conducted a t-test. The null hypothesis that 
both returns are equal cannot be rejected with a t-value of -1.56
12
. We also regressed the 
World Cup (Table 10) years only and compared the results. 
4. Since the competition takes place every June or July, we introduced this dummy variable 
on our regression model to understand if the effect was driven by the months or by the 
competition itself. We also compared the returns of World Cup years with non-World 
Cup ones for the month of June and July. The null hypothesis that both returns are equal 
cannot be rejected with a t-value of 1.9. 
 
 
                                                 
11
 French, Schwert and Stambaugh (1987) and Bollerslev, Engle and Nelson (1994) 














In the following section, we will present the regression results for all 17 past World Cups, com-
posed by 16,442 trading days, 255 Event Effect Days (EED) and 315 Event Effect Period Days 
(EPED). Table 3 reports our main regression results. Panel A and B resume the results for EED, 
whereas C and D resume for EPED. All Panels present regressions on Value-Weighted index 
(VW) and on Equally-weighted index (EW). The main variable analyzed will be the World Cup 
days, which assumes the value of EED or EPED.  
The main conclusions from our analysis are: 
1. The coefficient of the variable World Cup days is negative for all regressions and with 
high levels of significance, confirming the results of Kaplanski and Levy (2010 and 
2014). 
2. Our results are robust for all tested variables. This includes the length under analysis 
(EED and EPED), the model (with and without serial correlation, day of the week, tax 
year and holiday variables), the index (value- and equal-weighted index) and the most ex-
treme positive- and negative-return days. 
3. June-July variable is insignificant, meaning the fact that the event occurs during this two 




Table 3 - Main Regression results (1950-2014) 
Table 3 reports the results of the following regression: 𝑅𝑡 =  𝛾0 +  ∑ 𝛾1𝑖𝑅𝑡−𝑖 +  
2




𝑖=1 , where Rt is the daily stock return, γ0is the regression intercept coefficient, 
Rt-1and Rt-2are the first and second previous day returns, respectively, Dit , i = 1..4, are dummy variables for the day of the week: Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, respectively, Ht is a dummy variable for days 
after a non-weekend holiday, Tt is a dummy variable for the first five days of the fiscal year, Pt is a dummy variable for the annual event period (June–July), Et stands for the event days, and Jit, i = 1,2, are dummy variables 
for the 10 days with the highest (i = 1) and lowest (i = 2) returns during the studied period. The first line of each test reports the coefficients of the regression and the second line reports the t-values. *, ** and *** indicate a 
significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Case Gamma Rt-1 Rt-2 
Non weekend 
holidays Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday 
1st 5 days of 
Tax Jun-Jul 
World Cup 
days 10 best days 10 worst days 
R2 
 F 
Panel A - Event Effect Days (EED) - All Game Days 
VW 
             
 
1a - Base model (BM) 0,0008 
  





(0,76) (-7,07***) (-2,01**) (-0,16) (-1,72*) (1,45) (-0,23) (-2,99***) 
  
9,883 
2a - BM with serial corre-
lation 
0,0008 0,0668 -0,0373 0,0003 -0,0016 -0,0004 -0,0001 -0,0004 0,0007 0,0000 -0,0018 
  
0,010 
(5,11***) (8,58***) (-4,78***) (0,49) (-7,23***) (-1,64*) (-0,36) (-1,87*) (1,35) (-0,21) (-3,01***) 
  
17,100 
3a - BM without control 
dummy variables 
0,0004 










              
1a - Base model (BM) 0,0014 
  





(1,92*) (-11,55***) (-5,96***) (-2,1**) (-3,08***) (0,09) (-1,01) (-2,87***) 
  
22,050 
2a - BM with serial corre-
lation 
0,0013 0,1526 -0,0112 0,0005 -0,0026 -0,0010 -0,0004 -0,0007 -0,0001 -0,0002 -0,0015 
  
0,033 
(8,78***) (19,57***) (-1,44) (0,98) (-12,13***) (-4,67***) (-1,77*) (-3,24***) (-0,14) (-0,81) (-2,73***) 
  
56,568 
3a - BM without control 
dummy variables 
0,0005 









Panel B - EED + Extreme Days Dummy Variables 
VW 
              
1b - Base model (BM) 0,0008 
  
0,0004 -0,0015 -0,0005 0,0000 -0,0003 0,0007 -0,0001 -0,0018 0,0738 -0,0443 0,102 
(5,27***) 
  
(0,88) (-6,74***) (-2,33**) (-0,14) (-1,55) (1,52) (-0,49) (-3,11***) (26,92***) (-32,29***) 185,592 
2b - BM with serial corre-
lation 
0,0008 0,0648 -0,0106 0,0003 -0,0015 -0,0004 0,0000 -0,0004 0,0007 -0,0001 -0,0017 0,0744 -0,0438 0,106 
(5,14***) (8,74***) (-1,42) (0,64) (-6,88***) (-1,96**) (-0,19) (-1,66*) (1,39) (-0,45) (-3,07***) (26,92***) (-31,99***) 161,795 
3b - BM without control 
dummy variables 
0,0004 
         
-0,0019 0,0736 -0,0446 0,098 
(5,38***) 
         
(-3,48***) (26,8***) (-32,49***) 595,610 
EW 
              
1b - Base model (BM) 0,0014 
  
0,0010 -0,0024 -0,0013 -0,0004 -0,0006 0,0000 -0,0002 -0,0016 0,0791 -0,0445 0,125 
(9,85***) 
  
(2,11**) (-11,69***) (-6,46***) (-2,21**) (-3***) (0,08) (-1,11) (-3,06***) (30,83***) (-34,71***) 235,733 
2b - BM with serial corre-
lation 
0,0013 0,1409 0,0168 0,0005 -0,0025 -0,0010 -0,0003 -0,0006 -0,0001 -0,0002 -0,0015 0,0813 -0,0431 0,146 
(9,06***) (19,18***) (2,28**) (1,21) (-12,3***) (-5,28***) (-1,66*) (-3,07***) (-0,16) (-0,86) (-2,87***) (31,85***) (-33,9***) 234,055 
3b - BM without control 
dummy variables 
0,0005 
         
-0,0019 0,0789 -0,0449 0,116 
(7,52***) 
         




Case Gamma Rt-1 Rt-2 
Non weekend 
holidays Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday 
1st 5 days 
of Tax Jun-Jul 
World Cup 
days 10 best days 10 worst days 
R2 
 F 
Panel C - Event Effect Period Days (EPED) - All Game Days + 2 Days 
VW 
              1a - Base model (BM) 0,0008 
  





(0,75) (-7,11***) (-2,03**) (-0,21) (-1,76*) (1,49) (-0,2) (-2,77***) 
  
9,725 
2a - BM with serial 
correlation 
0,0008 0,0667 -0,0373 0,0003 -0,0016 -0,0004 -0,0001 -0,0004 0,0007 0,0000 -0,0015 
  
0,010 
(5,15***) (8,56***) (-4,79***) (0,49) (-7,27***) (-1,66*) (-0,41) (-1,9*) (1,4) (-0,18) (-2,75***) 
  
16,950 
3a - BM without control 
dummy variables 
0,0004 










              
1a - Base model (BM) 0,0014 
  





(1,92*) (-11,59***) (-5,98***) (-2,15**) (-3,12***) (0,12) (-0,89) (-2,9***) 
  
22,075 
2a - BM with serial 
correlation 
0,0013 0,1525 -0,0113 0,0005 -0,0026 -0,0010 -0,0004 -0,0007 0,0000 -0,0001 -0,0013 
  
0,033 
(8,82***) (19,55***) (-1,45) (0,97) (-12,17***) (-4,69***) (-1,82*) (-3,27***) (-0,1) (-0,74) (-2,63***) 
  
56,512 
3a - BM without control 
dummy variables 
0,0005 









Panel D - EPED + Extreme Days Dummy Variables 
VW 
              
1b - Base model (BM) 0,0008 
  
0,0004 -0,0015 -0,0005 0,0000 -0,0003 0,0008 -0,0001 -0,0015 0,0738 -0,0443 0,101 
(5,32***) 
  
(0,87) (-6,78***) (-2,35**) (-0,19) (-1,59) (1,57) (-0,45) (-2,87***) (26,92***) (-32,28***) 185,429 
2b - BM with serial 
correlation 
0,0008 0,0647 -0,0107 0,0003 -0,0015 -0,0004 -0,0001 -0,0004 0,0007 -0,0001 -0,0014 0,0744 -0,0438 0,106 
(5,18***) (8,72***) (-1,43) (0,63) (-6,92***) (-1,98**) (-0,24) (-1,7*) (1,43) (-0,43) (-2,78***) (26,92***) (-31,98***) 161,632 
3b - BM without control 
dummy variables 
0,0004 
         
-0,0016 0,0736 -0,0446 0,098 
(5,38***) 
         
(-3,2***) (26,8***) (-32,48***) 594,910 
EW 
              
1b - Base model (BM) 0,0014 
  
0,0010 -0,0024 -0,0013 -0,0004 -0,0006 0,0001 -0,0002 -0,0015 0,0791 -0,0445 0,125 
(9,89***) 
  
(2,11**) (-11,74***) (-6,48***) (-2,26**) (-3,04***) (0,12) (-0,99) (-3,09***) (30,83***) (-34,71***) 235,754 
2b - BM with serial 
correlation 
0,0013 0,1408 0,0167 0,0005 -0,0025 -0,0010 -0,0003 -0,0006 -0,0001 -0,0001 -0,0013 0,0813 -0,0431 0,146 
(9,1***) (19,16***) (2,27**) (1,2) (-12,34***) (-5,3***) (-1,71*) (-3,11***) (-0,13) (-0,8) (-2,74***) (31,85***) (-33,9***) 233,988 
3b - BM without control 
dummy variables 
0,0005 
         
-0,0017 0,0789 -0,0449 0,116 
(7,55***) 
         
(-3,64***) (30,59***) (-34,83***) 721,104 
25 
 
The next step taken was to analyze how a portfolio of $100 performed from the very first day of 
the 2014 FIFA World Cup until the end of the competition. As it can be seen on Figure 3, and 
against our hypothesis, the portfolio increased its value throughout the event ending with a value 
of $100.86 taking into consideration the equally-weighted index. The total return on equity dur-
ing 2014 was 0.45%, which means our portfolio had an even better performance during the com-
petition than it would have if held for the whole year.  
On Figure 3, we can also observe a scale of News, which aims to grade the economic 
news of that day. Classification is divided into: positive economic news (relative to consensus) 
represented by a “+” sign, negative economic news (relative to consensus) represented by a “–“ 
sign, inconclusive economic news (if both positive and negative economic news come out) rep-
resented by a “±” sign and neutral economic news (if no relevant news are issued on that day) 
represented by 0. All news are described in detail on Table 7 and were retrieved from Bloomberg 
Economic Calendar, which reports the main economic and financial news of the day, as well as a 
consensus scale. 
Moreover, two lines are presented: losing and eliminated countries. This information 
aims to understand how the stock market performed when certain teams lose or are eliminated. 
There are four interesting insights from this figure: (1) On June 16
th
, the U.S. national team de-
feated Ghana by 2-1, and from that same day stock market rallied until June 22
nd
; (2) On June 
22
nd
, U.S. sealed a draw against Portugal and the value of our portfolio decreased; (3) On June 
26
th
, U.S. loses against Germany, but advances to the next phase, which is seen as positive and 
the stock market increases until July 2
nd
; (4) U.S. is eliminated by Belgium on July 1
st
 and from 
that time our portfolio depreciates. These findings are coherent with Edmans et al. (2007), where 
a strong link was found between football results and local equity market. Our hypothesis is that 
U.S. investors are starting to take a closer attention to football
13
 and U.S. national team results 




                                                 
13
 Commonly known as “soccer” in the U.S. 
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Figure 3 - Losing and Eliminated Countries 
Figure 3 presents the value of $100 invested in the NYSE Index during the 2014 World Cup. The bold black line represents a hypothetical in-
vestment at the 2014 average return on equity of the whole year. The figure also presents the economic news divided by positive, negative, mixed 
and inconclusive (+, -, ± and 0, respectively). He second and third line represent the losing countries and the eliminated countries from one stage 
to the next one. 
 
The next step of our analysis was to evaluate the performance of $100 invested in the 
NYSE Composite Index during the past World Cup Editions and see how they performed. There 
are 17 World Cup Editions represented and all of them have a performance below a hypothetical 
investment on a risk free asset or at the average rate of return on equity for the whole period 
(1950-2014). The 1974
th
 FIFA World Cup Edition was the one where the value of $100 de-
creased the most. On the other side, the 1954
th
 edition was the one where the market valued the 
most. On average, each World Cup has 19 days, being the longest the 1998
th 





 edition (13 days). 
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Figure 4 - The value of $100 invested during all World Cups 
Figure 4 presents the value of $100 invested in the NYSE Index during all past World Cups. The dotted line represents the average return. The 
two bold straight lines correspond to the hypothetical investment of $100 at the average rate of return on equity (1950-2014) and the risk free,14 
respectively. 
 
In order to understand the possible effect of the disappointment of the fans during the 
World Cup and its influence on the stock market, we regressed on the returns of our portfolio 
two variables: (1) the accumulated percentage of population from the countries eliminated from 
the World Cup and (2) the accumulated percentage of investment in U.S. equity by countries 
eliminated from the World Cup.  
Starting with the NEWS dummy variable, we concluded that they are insignificant, but we 
need to consider that only a small sample was tested. Surprisingly and contrarily to what Kaplan-
ski and Levy (2014) found, the variable DISAPPOINTMENT is positively correlated with the 
returns of our portfolio with a high significance level. Our hypothesis is that this variable has lost 
strength compared to the last World Cup edition since it doesn’t seem logical that the less popu-







































lation and investment in the U.S. the better the performance, although it is highly significant. 
According to our results, the FINALS dummy variable had a negative correlation with our portfo-
lio performance, which can be easily verified on Figure 5 This finding is according to our expec-
tations, since neither the NEWS nor the DISAPPOINTMENT could explain this performance, and 
they were already included in the model. Taking into consideration the Durbin-Watson test, the 
series seems to be inconclusive regarding autocorrelation. 
Table 4 - Stock Market Returns and Fans’ disappointment 
Table 4 reports the results of the following regression: 
𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑇 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝐸𝑊𝑆𝑇 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑂𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑇 + 𝛽3𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑇 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑇−1 + 𝜀𝑇 , 
where the variable STOCKt denotes the value in day t of $100 invested in the NYSE Composite Index during the 2014 World Cup; NEWSt is 
equal to −1, 0 or 1 depending on whether the economic news in day t was negative, inconclusive or positive, respectively; DISAPPOINTMENTt 
is one of the fans’ disappointment variables: a) The accumulated percentage of the population corresponding to countries eliminated from the 
World Cup, which serves as a proxy for the potential number of disappointed fans; b) The accumulated percentage of investments in U.S. equities 
corresponding to countries eliminated from the World Cup, which serves as an indicator for the potential effect of the disappointed fans on the 
U.S. stock market; and FINALSt is a dummy variable corresponding to the Finals Period, which serves as a control variable to understand the 
decline during this period. The first line of each test reports the regression coefficients and the second line reports the corresponding standard 
errors’ t-values (in brackets). * indicates a significance level of 5%. ** indicates a significance level of 1%. 
Disappointment variable Constant News Disappointment Finals Stock -1 R
2 DW 
Potential number of disappointed fans 41,60 -0,10 0,99 -0,73 0,59 0,74 2,81 
 
(2,49*) (-0,67) (2,25*) (-2,39*) (3,52**) 
  
Eliminated countries' foreign direct investment in the U.S. 58,47 0,03 1,27 -0,61 0,42 0,74 2,84 
  (2,75**) (0,16) (2,34*) (-2,31*) (1,95) 
  
During the first stage, the negative sentiment was relatively small, since teams were not 
eliminated and even those who lost still had a chance to proceed to the next phase. Thus, the in-
crease in price can be attributed to the positive economic news released on June 12
th
 and on June 
16
th
. On the first part of the second stage, market prices remained stable, which was not coherent 
with the positive economic news and with the increased percentage of foreign direct investment 
in U.S. corresponding to eliminated countries. However, on June 26
th
, the price dipped, which 
can only be explained by an abrupt increase on the accumulated percentage of population and 
foreign direct investment by eliminated countries. From then on the value of our portfolio in-
creased steadily until the beginning of the third stage. An alternative explanation for the sharp 
increase at the beginning is the fact that sophisticated investors, who did not enjoy the full poten-
tial of the anomaly in 2010, bought stocks earlier which increased the market prices. During the 
final phase, a consistent depression on the value of our portfolio can be seen potentially motivat-
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ed by the negative sentiment. However, the positive economic news released during this period 
contradicts this movement. Finally, the inflection observed on July 11
th
 of 2014 was very similar 
to the one of 2010, which we argue was caused by investors’ expectation in a market rebound 
driving prices up. 
As we can observe on Figure 5, during the 2014
th
 FIFA World Cup the disappointment 
variables were positively correlated with the performance of the stock market, which contradicts 
the negative sentiment effect defended by Edmans et al. (2007) and further confirmed by 
Kaplanski and Levy (2010 and 2014). During the first and second stages of the event, the portfo-






Figure 5 - The U.S. Stock Market vs. Disappointed Fans 
Figure 5 juxtaposes the value of $100 invested in the NYSE Composite Index on the accumulated percentage of foreign direct investment in the U.S. corresponding to eliminated countries and the accumulated percentage of 




 Contrarily to past World Cup editions, the return of an equally-weighted portfolio on the 
NYSE Composite Index during the 2014
th
 edition was positive and above the stock market return 
of that year. Thus, the World Cup effect Kaplanski and Levy discovered in 2010 may have van-
ished. We propose two hypotheses for such disappearance: 
1) Football  popularity growth and US national team results 
 American football has been always the most popular sport in the U.S., seconded by bas-
ketball and baseball. These three sports account for 62% of all mentions and therefore take the 
lead. Historically, the “battle” between Racing, Hockey and Football has been tight, with Racing 
being the fourth, Football the fifth and Hockey the sixth. However, since the last World Cup in 
2010 this trend has changed considerably and U.S. has now more “Soccer” fans than any time in 
the last 20 years, as it can be seen on Figure 6. Despite it only got about 8% of the choices, pref-
erence is worth as much as Hockey and Racing together and therefore its influence on financial 
markets might be much higher than it was during the last World Cups. 
Figure 6 - Football Popularity in the US
15
 
Figure 6 reports the evolution of popularity among Football, Hockey and Racing from 1994 until 2013. The red dotted circle indicates the mo-
ment when football surpassed Hockey in popularity. 
 
In order to prove this increasing popularity, we also investigated the Major League Soc-
cer (MLS) attendance, as it is a decent proxy for the interest in Football. On Figure 7, we can 
observe that from 1996 until 2002, the number of football supporters remained relatively stable 
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at an average of 2.5m. However, since 2002 this number increased considerably reaching the 4m 
annually spectators. From 2010 onwards, the MLS attendance increased 55% to more than 6m 
annual spectators, which corresponds to an increase of 100% vs. 2002. An important contributor 
to this statistic was the arrival of many renowned players such as David Beckham (2007), Thier-
ry Henry (2010) and Kaká (2014). 
Figure 7 - Historical MLS Attendance 
Figure 7 reports the evolution of the MLS attendance from 1996 until 2014.  
 
Furthermore, to prove our hypothesis that football has increased its influence on the U.S. equity 
market, we decided to regress all results of the U.S. national team on the returns of the NYSE 
Composite Index equally weighted. Our regression is the following: 
𝑅𝑡 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾2𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑒𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡 , 
where Rt represents the return of NYSE Composite Index equally weighted taken from CRSP; 
GameDay is a dummy variable, which takes the values of 1, if a game occurred on that day or on 
the day before, or 0, if no games occur on that day and Results
16
, which assumes the value 1 for a 
victory of U.S. National Team, -1 for a defeat or a draw
17
 and 0, if no games are played. 
According to our research, returns are positively correlated with football Results after the 
2010
th
 FIFA World Cup, which means there might exist a link between victories and positive 
market returns and therefore football results are starting to have an influence on the U.S. equity 
market. On the other side, before the 2010
th
 World Cup, our results were mixed, hence no 
conclusion can be drawn. It is important to mention that the Results coefficients were not 
significant. We could also observe that the GameDay variable had a negative coefficient, which 
means every time the U.S. National team played the stock market returns were negative. This 
result was highly significant and would require further research. 
 




 The reference point of a football fans is that their team will win (also known as fans’ “allegiance bias”) and there-







1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
33 
 
Table 5 – Regression of Stock market returns on U.S. Results 
Table 5 reports the regression results of the following regression: 
𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑇 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑒𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑇 +  𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑠𝑇 + 𝜀𝑇 , 
where GameDay corresponds to a game trading day and the following day, Results corresponds to 1 if the U.S. national football team won, -1 if 
lost or drew and 0 otherwise. It aims to measure the influence of football on financial markets before and after the 2010th World Cup. There were 
taken into account 16,443 trading days, from January 1950 to December 2014. The period before the 2010th FIFA World Cup ranges from Janu-
ary 1950 to September 2010 and comprehends 15,379 trading days of which 584 are EED. The period after the 2010th FIFA World Cup ranges 
from October 2010 to December 2014 and comprehends 1,063 trading days of which 100 are EED. The total number of games analyzed was 597, 
divided into 5 competitions (World Cup, Gold Cup, Copa America, Confederations Cup and Olympics). The first line of each model reports the 
regression coefficients and the second line reports the corresponding t-values (in brackets).*** indicates a significance level of 1%. 
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2a. Base model without EED  0,0005 
   
0,0002 
 (6,56***) 




 World Cup 










2b. Base model without EED  0,0004 
   
0,0002 
  (1,23)       (0,16) 
On Table 6, we compare the average returns after an U.S. football team game before and 
after the 2010
th
 World Cup. Before the 2010
th
 World Cup, results were mixed, with negative av-
erage returns after a victory, positive after a draw and negative after a defeat. On the other hand, 
after the 2010
th
 World Cup, the average returns are positive after a victory, mixed after a draw 
and negative after a defeat. 
Although our sample is relatively small and the majority of our returns are not statistical-
ly different from zero, the results of the U.S. football team are starting to influence the American 
equity market. This conclusion proves the negative sentiment Edmans et al. (2007) defended, 







Table 6 – Average Stock Market Returns and U.S. Results 
Table 6 reports the average returns of the NYSE Composite Index equally-weighted on the day and one day after all games played by the U.S. 
national football team. There were taken into account 16,443 trading days, from January 1950 to December 2014. The period before the 2010th 
FIFA World Cup ranges from January 1950 to September. The period after the 2010th FIFA World Cup ranges from October 2010 to December. 
The total number of games analyzed was 597 (253 W, 125 D, 219 L), divided into 5 competitions (World Cup, Gold Cup, Copa America, Con-
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After the 2010th World Cup 



























































2) Published articles with arbitrage opportunities reduce considerably the returns of those free 
lunches 
Our second hypothesis is the one defended on McLean and Pontiff (2014) research, 
where returns on market anomalies tend to decrease around 35% after they are published. The 
authors attribute this change to sophisticated investors who put in practice the researchers’ work 
and to statistical biases. According to their results, the hypothesis that return-predictability does 
not change after the publication is rejected as well as that alpha post-publication does not exist. 
 It is reasonable to assume that sophisticated investors have taken advantage of this anom-
aly, making the free lunch disappear. Two facts support this argument: 
1. Not only the discovery of the effect drew a lot of professional investors’ attention, but al-
so the publication of an investment strategy
18
 just before the 2010
th
 FIFA World Cup. 
Therefore even less sophisticated investors could exploit the effect: 
“The obvious way of exploiting the tendency of the US stock market to perform poorly during the 
month-long FIFA World Cup is to short sell the S&P 500 index shortly before the tournament starts on 
Friday 11 June and close this position after the final game has been played on Sunday 11 July. The easiest 
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way of executing this trade to try to profit from the average 2.58 per cent fall in the S&P 500 during the 
tournament is through spread betting, whereby investors place a down bet for every point movement in the 
S&P 500. Although the index is denominated in dollars, there is no foreign currency risk as the down bet 
can be placed in sterling for every point movement in the index. Profits from spread betting are currently 
tax-free in the UK. In the UK, spread betting firms include IG Index, City Index, Capital Spreads, Cantor 
Index and CMC Markets. Alternatively, both Société Générale and Royal Bank of Scotland have issued 
several covered put warrants on the index. The one that fits our trading time frame best is SB07 which has 
an expiry date of 17 December 2010, exercise price of 1300 and parity of1000:1. With the S&P 500 trading 
at 1158 and the sterling dollar exchange rate £1:$1.50 these put warrants are priced at 144p.This means 
that around 66 per cent of the warrant premium is ‘in-the-money’ and the rest is ‘out-of-the-money’. As-
suming that the implied volatility of the warrants remains constant then they are effectively geared 4 times 
to movements in the underlying index so a 2.58 per cent fall in the index over the course of the World Cup 
would generate a 10 per cent profit. By the same token, a 2.58 percent rise in the index would lead to a 10 
per cent loss.” 
2. Kaplanski and Levy (2014) observed a rebound during the Finals period, which accord-
ing to their hypothesis was driven by sophisticated professional investors that took ad-














Motivated by the influence of sports results on stock market returns, firstly described by Edmans 
et al. (2007) and later explored by Kaplanski and Levy (2010 and 2014), this paper investigates 
the World Cup effect during the 2014
th
 edition. A financial anomaly, where the average rate of 
return of all past World Cups is -2.23% compared to +11.30% of all years’ average returns over 
the same period length. 
We found that during the latest edition the returns were positive and therefore the anoma-
ly disappeared. Kaplanski and Levy (2010) tested the anomaly on the U.S. equity market based 
on the international aggregate effect and not on the results. However, the influence of U.S. foot-
ball team results on the local stock market has increased exponentially since 2010. Therefore, we 
attribute the disappearance of the effect to (1) the increased popularity of football in the United 
States and to (2) the publication of the articles exposing such anomaly. 
These findings have important implications for all players involved in the behavioral fi-
nance field. For investors, they now know the World Cup effect disappeared and no further free 
lunches will be taken. Therefore, investors will focus their investments on other strategies. Nev-
ertheless, it opened a potential arbitrage opportunity, where the U.S. national football team re-
sults might be positively related with market returns, however further research is needed to con-
firm this trend. For academics, it filled the gap left by Kaplanski and Levy (2010) by uncovering 
the disappearance of the anomaly. It also complemented current literature by discovering the 
potential factors which led to the arbitrage opportunity departure and launched further research 
on potential market anomalies. 
We suggest further investigation on the influence of U.S. national football team results on 
the stock market returns. Our research presented a positive correlation between returns and victo-
ries as well as a positive and significantly different from zero return on a victory of the national 
team. However, due to limited data our results didn’t show the statistically robustness needed to 





Table 7 - News from Bloomberg Economic Calendar 
Dates Summary Positive Negative Inconclusive 
Overall 
Assessment 
12-06-2014 Prior economic strength helped take the edge off both retail sales and 
jobless claims. Respectable growth underway in the jobs market. 
Jobless claims, Retail 
Sales, Import and Export 
Prices 
  + 
13-06-2014 Economic news includes a steady mid-month reading on consumer 
sentiment.  
Decrease on PPI-FD 
monthly of 0,2% 
CPI disappointed  ± 
16-06-2014 The factory sector is adding solidly to second-quarter growth. The 
status of the housing sector is uncertain, evidenced by today's hous-
ing market report which came in better-than-expected but still slight-
ly in the contractionary zone.  
Industrial Production rose, 
Housing Market Index 
  + 
17-06-2014 Deep declines for housing starts & permits and a sudden lurch higher 
for consumer prices where year-on-year rates are now just above or 
near the key 2.0 percent zone.  
CPI had a small increase Disappointing Housing Starts  ± 
18-06-2014 Soft job growth is the chief concern at the FOMC which otherwise 
sees strength ahead for the economy, especially coming out of the 
weather-related dip in the first quarter.  
Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) News 
- taper remains 
  + 
19-06-2014 Continuing declines for jobless claims and impressive strength 
throughout the Philly Fed manufacturing report. The index of leading 
economic indicators is also solid though held back by a key area of 
weakness in the economy -- housing permits. 
Jobless claims decline, 
Strong Philadelphia Fed's 
Business Outlook Survey 
report 
  + 
20-06-2014 Economic news is mostly positive and the Fed is described as dovish.    0 
23-06-2014 The factory sector is as strong as ever, while housing appears to be 
showing some life of its own, at least based on today's very positive 
existing home sales report.  
Very positive Home sales 
report and PMI Manufac-
turing index 
  + 
24-06-2014 Surge in new home sales and a gain for consumer confidence. De-
mand for the safety of Treasuries rose with the 10-year yield down 4 
basis points to 2.58 percent. 
New Home sales positive, 
Consumer Confidence 
increased 
Iraq airstrikes, S&P Case-
Shiller HPI downward from 
trend 
 ± 
25-06-2014 GDP was revised sharply lower in the first quarter, to an ominous 
looking minus 2.9 percent. Durable goods orders also show contrac-
tion in data for May, And outside of this report, other data from the 
manufacturing sector have been strong. 
Manufacturing sector 
keeps strong 
Weaker durables orders than 
expected for May. Real GDP 
surprised on the downside 
 ± 
26-06-2014 Continuing favorable indications from jobless claims. Personal in-
come showed solid gains but personal outlays were soft.  
Jobless claims  Personal income 
and outlays 
0 
27-06-2014 The day's only economic news was a mostly upbeat consumer senti-
ment report that points to specific strength for June. 




Dates Summary Positive Negative Inconclusive 
Overall 
Assessment 
30-06-2014 Home sales appear to be heating up fast. Last week's reports on new 
home sales and existing home sales were very encouraging, followed 
today by a very strong rise in pending home sales. 
Pending Home Sales 
Index, Dallas Fed Mfg 
Survey 
Chicago PMI  0 
01-07-2014 Strong acceleration in new orders headlined solid manufacturing 
reports. Looking at construction, spending slowed in May but April 
was revised sharply higher. Auto sales are now back at the height of 
the last economic expansion back in 2006. 
Strong Manufacturing 
reports (PMI Manufactur-
ing Index). Auto Sales are 
up 
Construction Spending ISM Mfg Index + 
02-07-2014 Janet Yellen's speech was on the theoretically side, focusing on long-
term risks to monetary policy, not short-term ones. Factory orders 
were on the weak side. Surge in ADP's employment count. 
Positive ADP's employ-
ment count 
Factory orders  + 
03-07-2014 June's employment report easily beat expectations. Trade data show-
ing a rise in exports, and the ISM non-manufacturing report showing 
impressive acceleration in new orders. 
Employment report, low 
jobless claims, rise in 
exports, acceleration in 
new orders by the ISM 
non-manufacturing report 
  + 
08-07-2014 Demand for labor is on the rise, confirmed by the JOLTS report.  Job openings, positive 
chain store reports and 
consumer credit 
  + 
09-07-2014 FOMC minutes that confirm expectations for gradual tapering of 
asset purchases followed by the first rate hike sometime next year. 
Lack of alarm over the inflation outlook is another positive in the 
minutes. 
 Taper is on schedule and 
likely will end in October if 
the economy follows forecast 
 - 
10-07-2014 Jobless claims data continue to signal solid strength for the labor 
market.  
Jobless claims   + 
11-07-2014 Treasury's deficit is coming down reflected in a $70.5 billion surplus 
for the month of June.  
Treasury deficit is coming 
down 
  + 
14-07-2014 Strong results from Citigroup. Money moved out of the safety of 
Treasuries where yields moved several basis points higher including 
a 3 basis point rise for the 10-year note to 2.55 percent. 





Table 8 - Total Population of World Cup countries 
Table 8 reports the World Cup participants and its respective population in 2013.  










Costa Rica 5 

























Table 9 - Main regression results (1950-2006) 
Table 9 reports the results of the following regression: 𝑅𝑡 =  𝛾0 +  ∑ 𝛾1𝑖𝑅𝑡−𝑖 +  
2




𝑖=1 , where Rt is the daily stock return, γ0is the regression intercept coefficient, 
Rt-1and Rt-2are the first and second previous day returns, respectively, Dit , i = 1..4, are dummy variables for the day of the week: Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, respectively, Ht is a dummy variable for days 
after a non-weekend holiday, Tt is a dummy variable for the first five days of the fiscal year, Pt is a dummy variable for the annual event period (June–July), Et stands for the event days, and Jit, i = 1,2, are dummy variables 
for the 10 days with the highest (i = 1) and lowest (i = 2) returns during the studied period. The first line of each test reports the coefficients of the regression and the second line the t-value. *, ** and *** indicate a signifi-
cance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Case Gamma Rt-1 Rt-2 
Non week-
end holidays Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday 










Panel A - Event Effect Days (EED) - All Game Days 
            VW 
              1a - Base model (BM) 0,0009 
  





(0,96) (-7,74***) (-2,85***) (0,2) (-1,88*) (2,63***) (-0,12) (-3,66***) 
  
13,164 
2a - BM with serial correlation 0,0008 0,1346 -0,0447 0,0002 -0,0017 -0,0004 0,0000 -0,0005 0,0011 0,0000 -0,0021 
  
0,026 
(5,45***) (16,18***) (-5,38***) (0,42) (-8,06***) (-2,09**) (0,04) (-2,25**) (2,35**) (-0,05) (-3,61***) 
  
38,018 
3a - BM without control dummy 
variables 
0,0004 










              
1a - Base model (BM) 
0,0015 
  





(2,4**) (-13,43***) (-7,84***) (-2,01**) (-3,42***) (1,42) (-1,02) (-3,71***) 
  
32,023 
2a - BM with serial correlation 
0,0013 0,2684 -0,0413 0,0002 -0,0027 -0,0010 -0,0002 -0,0007 0,0003 -0,0001 -0,0017 
  
0,084 
(9,9***) (32,26***) (-4,97***) (0,56) (-14,77***) (-5,25***) (-1,26) (-4,03***) (0,83) (-0,66) (-3,45***) 
  
132,734 
3a - BM without control dummy 
variables 
0,0005 









Panel B - EED + Extreme Days Dummy Variables 
            
VW 
              
1b - Base model (BM) 
0,0009 
  
0,0005 -0,0015 -0,0006 0,0000 -0,0004 0,0013 -0,0001 -0,0021 0,0696 -0,0498 0,058 
(11,25***) 
  
(2,48**) (-13,34***) (-8,06***) (-2,35**) (-3,51***) (1,45) (-1,09) (-3,82***) (15,72***) (-23,75***) 89,132 
2b - BM with serial correlation 
0,0008 0,1264 -0,0364 0,0002 -0,0016 -0,0005 0,0000 -0,0005 0,0011 -0,0001 -0,0020 0,0658 -0,0490 0,074 
(10,11***) (32,52***) (-3,42***) (0,64) (-14,72***) (-5,49***) (-1,51) (-4,06***) (0,82) (-0,7) (-3,52***) (17,25***) (-23,16***) 96,283 
3b - BM without control dummy 
variables 
0,0004 
         
-0,0022 0,0701 -0,0503 0,053 
(8,43***) 
         
(-4,43***) (15,71***) (-23,88***) 269,686 
EW 
              
1b - Base model (BM) 
0,0015 
  
0,0011 -0,0025 -0,0015 -0,0004 -0,0006 0,0006 -0,0002 -0,0019 0,0781 -0,0590 0,070 
(11,25***) 
  
(2,48**) (-13,34***) (-8,06***) (-2,35**) (-3,51***) (1,45) (-1,09) (-3,82***) (15,72***) (-23,75***) 108,190 
2b - BM with serial correlation 
0,0013 0,2632 -0,0279 0,0003 -0,0026 -0,0010 -0,0003 -0,0007 0,0003 -0,0001 -0,0017 0,0836 -0,0556 0,135 
(10,11***) (32,52***) (-3,42***) (0,64) (-14,72***) (-5,49***) (-1,51) (-4,06***) (0,82) (-0,7) (-3,52***) (17,25***) (-23,16***) 187,089 
3b - BM without control dummy 
variables 
0,0005 
         
-0,0021 0,0786 -0,0597 0,055 
(8,43***) 
         




Case Gamma Rt-1 Rt-2 
Non week-
end holi-
days Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday 
1st 5 days of 
Tax Jun-Jul 
World Cup 
days 10 best days 10 worst days 
R2  
F 
Panel C - Event Effect Period Days (EPED) - All Game Days + 2 Days 
          VW 
              
1a - Base model (BM) 
0,0009 
  





(0,95) (-7,79***) (-2,87***) (0,14) (-1,93*) (2,68***) (-0,06) (-3,4***) 
  
12,940 
2a - BM with serial 
correlation 
0,0008 0,1344 -0,0448 0,0002 -0,0017 -0,0004 0,0000 -0,0005 0,0012 0,0000 -0,0017 
  
0,026 
(5,5***) (16,16***) (-5,39***) (0,41) (-8,12***) (-2,11**) (-0,02) (-2,3**) (2,41**) (-0,03) (-3,24***) 
  
37,762 
3a - BM without control 
dummy variables 
0,0004 










              
1a - Base model (BM) 
0,0015 
  





(2,4**) (-13,49***) (-7,86***) (-2,07**) (-3,47***) (1,47) (-0,87) (-3,75***) 
  
32,055 
2a - BM with serial 
correlation 
0,0013 0,2682 -0,0414 0,0002 -0,0027 -0,0010 -0,0002 -0,0007 0,0004 -0,0001 -0,0014 
  
0,084 
(9,95***) (32,23***) (-4,98***) (0,56) (-14,83***) (-5,27***) (-1,33) (-4,08***) (0,88) (-0,61) (-3,19***) 
  
132,550 
3a - BM without control 
dummy variables 
0,0005 









Panel D - EPED + Extreme Days Dummy Variables 
            VW 
              
1b - Base model (BM) 
0,0009 
  
0,0005 -0,0015 -0,0006 0,0000 -0,0004 0,0013 -0,0001 -0,0018 0,0696 -0,0498 0,058 
(5,84***) 
  
(0,98) (-7,31***) (-2,95***) (-0,09) (-1,98**) (2,74***) (-0,39) (-3,44***) (12,39***) (-25,04***) 88,928 
2b - BM with serial 
correlation 
0,0008 0,1263 -0,0364 0,0002 -0,0016 -0,0005 0,0000 -0,0005 0,0012 -0,0001 -0,0017 0,0658 -0,0490 0,074 
(5,68***) (15,56***) (-4,44***) (0,47) (-7,62***) (-2,21**) (-0,19) (-2,31**) (2,46**) (-0,35) (-3,27***) (11,65***) (-24,83***) 96,045 
3b - BM without control 
dummy variables 
0,0004 
         
-0,0018 0,0701 -0,0503 0,053 
(5,86***) 
         
(-3,74***) (12,44***) (-25,25***) 268,756 
EW 
              
1b - Base model (BM) 
0,0015 
  
0,0011 -0,0025 -0,0015 -0,0004 -0,0007 0,0006 -0,0002 -0,0017 0,0781 -0,0590 0,070 
(11,31***) 
  
(2,47**) (-13,4***) (-8,08***) (-2,42**) (-3,57***) (1,5) (-0,93) (-3,86***) (15,72***) (-23,75***) 108,218 
2b - BM with serial 
correlation 
0,0013 0,2630 -0,0280 0,0003 -0,0027 -0,0010 -0,0003 -0,0007 0,0004 -0,0001 -0,0014 0,0836 -0,0556 0,135 
(10,16***) (32,49***) (-3,43***) (0,64) (-14,78***) (-5,51***) (-1,57) (-4,11***) (0,88) (-0,66) (-3,26***) (17,24***) (-23,16***) 186,916 
3b - BM without control 
dummy variables 
0,0005 
         
-0,0019 0,0786 -0,0597 0,055 
(8,48***) 
         





Table 10 - Robustness checks 
Table 10 reports the results of the following regression: 𝑅𝑡 =  𝛾0 +  ∑ 𝛾1𝑖𝑅𝑡−𝑖 +  
2




𝑖=1 , where 𝑅𝑡 is the daily stock return, 𝛾0is the regression intercept coefficient, 
𝑅𝑡−1and 𝑅𝑡−2are the first and second previous day returns, respectively, 𝐷𝑖𝑡 , i = 1..4, are dummy variables for the day of the week: Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, respectively, 𝐻𝑡  is a dummy variable for days 
after a non-weekend holiday, 𝑇𝑡 is a dummy variable for the first five days of the fiscal year, 𝑃𝑡  is a dummy variable for the annual event period (June–July), 𝐸𝑡  stands for the event days, and 𝐽𝑖𝑡, i = 1,2, are dummy variables 
for the 10 days with the highest (i = 1) and lowest (i = 2) returns during the studied period. The regression period corresponding to the World Cup years only is composed by 17 World Cups (1950, 1954, 1958, 1962, 1966, 
1970, 1974, 1978, 1982, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014), with 4,333 trading days and  315 EPED. The regression period corresponding to the June-July period includes 2,757 trading days and 313 EPED. 
The first line of each test reports the coefficients of the regression and the second line the t-value. *, ** and *** indicate a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Case Gamma Rt-1 Rt-2 
Non weekend 
holidays Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday 
1st 5 







Panel A - Outliers Sensivity 
             
Without the World Cup of 
1950 
0,0013 0,1419 0,0172 0,0005 -0,0024 -0,0010 -0,0003 -0,0006 -0,0001 -0,0001 -0,0011 0,0813 -0,0431 0,147 
(9,03***) (19,3***) (2,33**) (1,19) (-12,24***) (-5,24***) (-1,69*) (-3,03***) (-0,17) (-0,79) (-2,17**) (31,94***) (-33,98***) 234,809 
Without the World Cup of 
1974 
0,0013 0,1403 0,0165 0,0006 -0,0025 -0,0010 -0,0003 -0,0006 0,0001 -0,0001 -0,0009 0,0813 -0,0431 0,146 
(9,09***) (19,1***) (2,24**) (1,22) (-12,32***) (-5,32***) (-1,72*) (-3,11***) (0,19) (-0,82) (-1,92*) (31,86***) (-33,92***) 233,319 
Without the World Cup of 
1950 and 1974 
0,0013 0,1413 0,0169 0,0005 -0,0024 -0,0010 -0,0003 -0,0006 0,0001 -0,0001 -0,0007 0,0813 -0,0431 0,146 
(9,03***) (19,23***) (2,29**) (1,21) (-12,22***) (-5,26***) (-1,7*) (-3,04***) (0,18) (-0,82) (-1,31) (31,94***) (-34,00***) 234,227 
Without the World Cup of 
1974 and 2002 
0,0013 0,1404 0,0169 0,0005 -0,0025 -0,0010 -0,0003 -0,0006 0,0001 -0,0001 -0,0008 0,0813 -0,0431 0,146 
(9,04***) (19,1***) (2,28**) (1,21) (-12,28***) (-5,27***) (-1,67*) (-3,08***) (0,19) (-0,81) (-1,62) (31,86***) (-33,92***) 233,144 
Panel B - World Cup Years Only 
            
1b - Base model (BM) 0,0013 
  





(0,47) (-6,09***) (-3,66***) (0,4) (-2,35**) (-0,8) (-0,29) (-2,19**) 
  
8,526 
2b - BM with serial correla-
tion 
0,0004 









3b - BM without control 
dummy variables 
0,0013 0,2488 -0,0120 -0,0005 -0,0028 -0,0011 0,0002 -0,0013 -0,0007 -0,0001 -0,0012 0,0618 
 
0,086 
(4,43***) (16,4***) (-0,79) (-0,5) (-6,86***) (-2,83***) (0,59) (-3,15***) (-0,76) (-0,16) (-1,89*) (7,44***) 
 
33,588 
Panel C - June-July               
1c - Base model (BM) 0,0013 
  












2c - BM with serial correla-
tion 
0,0003 









3c - BM without control 
dummy variables 
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